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INTRODUCTION 
 
The exchange rate has always been a highly sensitive political concern, 
because it is one of the country’s windows abroad. In this sense, devaluations 
or depreciations are considered a defeat of economic policy and an erosion of 
national governments’ credibility. Furthermore, when the exchange rate 
finally adjusts, the trading partners are, for good reasons, fearing that a 
‘beggar-your-neighbour’ development will ensue. And even if a regime of 
fixed exchange rates is well designed, it may suffer in practice from a number 
of built-in weaknesses, which lead to these seemingly inevitable economic 
crises where high rates of interest and financial bankruptcies cause 
unemployment. The history of exchange rate arrangements is paved with 
such financial crises. The more recent and spectacular examples were the 
breakdowns of the European Monetary System in 1992–93, the South-East 
Asian crises in 1998, followed by the Russian, Brazilian, Turkish, and 
Argentinean crises. Indeed, the list seems endless. 
One of the major conclusions of this chapter is that even within the 
European Union (EU), currency and financial crises remain a current threat. 
The economic performances of the 25 countries in the Union are dissonant, 
with balance-of-payments imbalances building up, rates of inflation rising, 
and unemployment rates diverging among member countries. Hence, in that 
perspective we will argue that it is difficult to imagine future financial crises 
being avoided, especially for the new member-countries (EU-10) that are still 
in transition from a planned economic system to a full-scale market economy. 
An additional disturbing matter is that these countries are undertaking this 
transition under the severe Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which forces EU 
countries into a considerable fiscal and monetary straightjacket. Moreover, 
the ten new EU countries have been asked to make their macroeconomic 
development conform to the EMU convergence criteria of low inflation, and 
to prepare themselves for participation to the fixed exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM2), in which the euro is the anchor currency. 
2 Exchange Rate Systems: From Instability to Stability 
The overall objective of this chapter is to discuss the possible exchange 
rate regimes that the ten new EU countries (especially the former Eastern 
European countries) could choose for the future. Before beginning, however, 
we should keep in mind that these ten countries, except Poland, are all 
considered ‘small and open economies’ with respect to foreign trade. Even 
though the population of these countries reach 80 million citizens, their total 
GDP is only a little more than five per cent of the EU-15’s total GDP. 
Moreover, the average income per capita in these countries is less than a third 
of the EU-15’s. Hence, in terms of living standards and macroeconomic 
impact we are considering two separate worlds. If these two worlds should 
grow more equal, then the poorest countries could embark on an export-led 
growth path (as Ireland did in the early 1990s) without changing the 
economic development in the EU-15 in any significant way. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section gives a brief 
overview of two distinct (and competing) macroeconomic theories: the new 
consensus economics (which is a merge of neoclassical and new-Keynesian 
equilibrium economics), and post-Keynesian macroeconomics.1 In the third 
section we evaluate the different monetary and exchange rate arrangements 
and balance-of-payments constraints within the EU from a post-Keynesian 
point of view. In the fourth section we discuss how the exchange rate 
arrangements existing within the EU fit the overall growth strategy of the 
EU-10 countries. We conclude arguing that the new EU-10 countries should 
be allowed to follow an individually adapted exchange rate policy, which 
could mirror the differences among the countries and the fragile structures of 
the transitional economies. 
 
 
TWO DIFFERENT VIEWS ON GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT, 
AND ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
Although the political sensitivity towards unemployment within the EU (new 
as well as old member-countries) has decreased, high unemployment is still a 
matter of concern. In this section we argue that, in countries with high 
unemployment, demand management and the exchange rate arrangement are 
important factors explaining the development of employment. Germany, as 
well as France, Poland, and Sweden are cases in point. 
For instance, an unemployment rate close to 10 per cent is still a political 
liability in Germany in 2005. The government of Gerhard Schröder failed to 
improve on employment during its term in office. Of course, many reasons 
have been put forward for the disastrous employment record. Conventional 
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neoclassical equilibrium theory is blaming inflexible and sclerotic labour 
market structures. Post-Keynesian theorists, on the other hand, put more 
emphasis on the lack of effective demand for labour in countries where 
unemployment is substantial. 
 
New-Consensus Macroeconomics 
 
Within the neoclassical/new-Keynesian (today the so-called New Consensus) 
macroeconomics, sustained levels of high unemployment are caused by 
structural factors in the labour market and hardly, if at all, affected by 
demand factors. This strand of thought argues that unemployment is due to a 
lack of real wage flexibility, which is caused by exaggerated labour 
protective legislation, generous unemployment benefits, trade unions, and 
incentive-reducing wage and income taxes (for a textbook presentation, see 
Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen, 2004). 
Saint-Paul (2004) goes one step further, and combines the new consensus 
macroeconomic theory with political theory. He gives a revealing example of 
this ‘changed ideology’ (to use his own expression) within the so-called New 
Consensus political economy. According to Saint-Paul (2004, p. 63), 
financial crises are necessary events that, by short-term hardship, prepare the 
public opinion for much needed labour market reforms. Hence, an external 
shock would rather have a (longer-term) beneficial effect by creating an 
increased political pressure for the, according to Saint-Paul (2004), 
objectively needed labour market flexibility and welfare reforms to improve 
employment.2 
New Consensus political economists would further argue that a sustained 
public sector deficit is further evidence of an excessive fiscal policy and of 
labour market rigidities. If the labour market was made sufficiently flexible, 
and if politicians were made responsible for matching public expenses with 
current income, the structural budget will be self-balancing. Hence, within 
this theoretical perspective, a sustained public deficit is a sign of unsound 
public finances and/or labour market rigidities. In both cases a fiscal crisis 
unveils the needed labour market reforms and fiscal consolidation. A 
balanced budget is a remedy (together with labour market reforms), and 
solves the fiscal crisis and reduces involuntary unemployment as well. 
This new political and economic consensus is the official theoretical 
argument underpinning current EU strategies for growth and employment. 
Hence, unemployment cannot be addressed by macroeconomic policies, but 
is a matter of labour market organization, together with national structural 
programmes and welfare reforms. In this theoretical setting, unemployment 
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has become a matter of national policies, where exchange rate arrangements 
are of a second-order concern. 
Macroeconomic policies and exchange rate arrangements are mainly 
directed towards monetary stability. Price stability becomes the overarching 
macroeconomic goal. Hence, an inflation-target oriented monetary policy and 
irrevocably fixed exchange rates are considered suitable for this stability, 
which promotes the EU ambition of high economic growth. 
 
Post-Keynesian Considerations 
 
If we consider the German case, the new-consensus macroeconomics fails to 
explain the development in employment. In fact, the number of jobs 
expanded by nearly 2 millions during the period 1998–2000 without any 
structural reforms.3 This expansion was brought to a stop by the international 
downturn in 2001–03, when the German economy was hit by weak foreign 
(and domestic) demand. Then rising unemployment brought the German 
government’s budget into conflict with the 3 per cent limit of the SGP, and 
the government was forced once again to tighten fiscal policy to avoid 
political and economic punishment from the other EU countries. 
Furthermore, the employment prospects seemed to have deteriorated even 
in spite of the 2004–05 labour market reforms, which were mainly directed 
towards a reduction of social welfare for unemployed citizens. During the 
spring of 2005 the number of registered unemployed citizens breached the 5 
million benchmark. 
This development of expanding and contracting employment is fully 
consistent with post-Keynesian theory, where fluctuations in effective 
demand for goods and services are a main (but of course not the only) factor 
causing changes in growth rates and employment (see for instance Arestis 
and Sawyer, 2003). 
In short, post-Keynesian macroeconomics stipulates that expanding 
effective demand is a necessary, but in many cases not a sufficient factor, to 
improve employment. Effective demand, it is argued, is affected by private 
sector behaviour toward consumption and real investment, economic policies 
and international competitiveness. In that theoretical perspective, the public, 
private, and foreign sectors are interrelated, and it is hardly meaningful to 
specify a target for the public sector budget independently of the 
development of the other two sectors. 
With these fundamental theoretical divergences and political priorities in 
mind, we are better equipped to understand and to evaluate the challenges the 
EU-10 countries are confronted with when they have to choose a future 
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strategy for their exchange rate arrangement within the EU. 
 
 
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND EXCHANGE RATE 
ARRANGEMENTS IN A POST-KEYNESIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
In the post-Keynesian perspective, macroeconomic stability can be disrupted 
by a lack of effective demand. In this section we discuss how the balance of 
payments interferes with macroeconomic stability, and how the design of the 
exchange rate arrangement transmits effective demand through external 
relationships. 
There are two major constraints on domestic growth emanating from the 
balance of payments: a lack of foreign effective demand (net exports and 
foreign direct investment), and a lack of foreign reserves (which holds back 
domestic expansion). These are explained in turn below. 
The current account, together with the inflow of foreign direct investment, 
measures the foreign net effect on effective demand, which is crucial for 
growth and employment. By contrast, a purely domestic expansion may run 
into a lack of foreign reserves constraint as the current account deteriorates 
and foreign long-term capital inflows dry up. 
The exchange rate is a macroeconomic price that has a major impact on 
international competitiveness. When one of the balance-of-payments 
constraints is binding, the exchange rate could be a useful instrument: in a 
freely floating exchange rate regime, the government has no formal exchange 
rate commitment. In this case, the ‘lack of foreign reserves’ constraint ceases 
to be binding, because the exchange rate is solely determined by the 
aggregate effect of private transactions in the current and capital accounts. 
Movements of the exchange rate have an impact on effective demand, as we 
mentioned above. Hence, the constraint of the foreign effective demand is 
also present in a floating exchange rate regime, and expected changes of the 
exchange rate play an important role as a borrowing cost on foreign loans. 
 
Foreign Effective Demand Constraint 
 
In the post-Keynesian perspective, effective demand for goods and services is 
given highest priority when dealing with growth and unemployment. Of 
course, there is no one-to-one relationship between balance-of-payments 
transactions and effective demand. Nonetheless, there will be a rather close 
link between the transactions recorded in the current account and effective 
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demand. Exports of goods and services have an immediate effect on 
production and employment, whereas imports substitute domestic production, 
which reduces effective demand at home (and increases it abroad). When 
analyzing the impact of balance-of-payments transactions on effective 
demand, we should also add (at least a part of) foreign direct investment. 
Indeed, when such direct investments are made real, in the sense of setting up 
new factories, renovating old plants, or building houses, they increase 
effective demand like any other real investment, and should be analyzed as 
such. On the other hand, foreign direct investment consisting of buying 
shares in existing firms, with no explicit purpose of making real investment, 
are more like financial portfolio investment and do not add to effective 
demand. 
As long as countries have separate currencies, they should keep in mind 
Thirlwall’s theory of balance-of-payments constrained growth (McCombie, 
2003), because in that case the domestic growth process could at any time be 
hindered or impeded by a lack of foreign effective demand or by a lack of 
foreign exchange causing indeed a financial crisis. Hence, the exchange rate 
arrangement plays a crucial role for countries that are in a vulnerable process 
of catching up with more mature economies, such as the EU-10 in respect of 
the EU-15. 
 
Foreign-Exchange-Reserves Constraint 
 
The growth process may also be constrained by a lack of foreign liquidity, 
when the stock of foreign reserves is low. In that case, a financial crisis can 
occur if the deficit in the foreign exchange market is not reduced through 
credible economic policies. In this sense, the foreign exchange market can be 
disrupted by speculative short-term financial flows. Foreign exchange 
reserves are a protection against this source of disturbance. Keynes as well as 
post-Keynesian economists (Davidson, 1997) favour a ban on speculative 
international transactions, which more often than not put the international 
financial system under stress (see also Rochon and Vernengo, 2000). The 
foreign-exchange-reserves constraint can be handled in a more orderly way in 
a system without financial flows generated by currency speculation. 
Unfortunately, in practice it is difficult to separate serious long-term capital 
movements from speculative financial transactions. In fact, the EU Treaty 
requires free cross-border capital flows, and does not distinguish between 
sound and unsound financial capital movements. 
The most important institutional change within international finance over 
the last two decades has been the elimination of border controls on financial 
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capital movements within the OECD area. As a consequence, the citizens of 
the EU countries are free to borrow from any country abroad. Private banks 
and larger firms, therefore, cannot be liquidity constrained as long as they are 
able to pay the market rate of interest (and have the required 
creditworthiness). Those governments that have committed themselves to 
keep a fixed exchange rate, however, might become foreign reserve-
constrained. Hence, in a fixed exchange rate regime there is always a risk that 
foreign reserves may be drained more quickly than the government is able to 
provide new and sufficient quantities of them. Paradoxically, free capital 
movements imply that governments have to stock an even larger foreign 
exchange reserve than within a system where capital controls prevail. 
 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
In a fixed exchange rate regime without international capital controls, the 
central bank has to sell or buy whatever amount of foreign exchange the 
private sector requires. The central bank needs to have sufficient foreign 
reserves (and credit lines) to satisfy existing demand. Substantial capital 
outflows reduce the privately held amount of central bank money (M0), 
which then puts some upward pressure on money market interest rates. If the 
day-to-day rate of interest goes beyond, say, 100 per cent (per annum), the 
politicians (and with them the public opinion) are prepared for a substantial 
devaluation of the exchange rate. 
A fixed exchange rate regime is biased against the deficit country, because 
the surplus countries can just leave the rate of interest at a level that best fits 
their domestic economy. When the central bank of the deficit country 
experiences a foreign-reserves constraint, something has to give in. On the 
other hand, there is no mechanism, except for international political pressure, 
that can prevent a central bank of a surplus country from going on 
accumulating foreign reserves. In fact, a ‘strong currency’ is an undervalued 
currency, which generates a substantial surplus in the current account. A 
strong currency position leaves more room for directing monetary and fiscal 
policies towards domestic imbalances. 
On the other hand, foreign reserves are somewhat costly to accumulate, 
because the central bank will only obtain a yield on its reserves equal to the 
interest rate on the anchor currency. Hence, any country – except for the 
anchor-currency country – that takes part in a fixed exchange rate system has 
to pay a participation fee, which amounts to the difference between the 
domestic and the foreign rate of interest times the average size of the foreign 
reserves. One could also call it a ‘currency discount’. The mechanism is the 
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following: the larger the accumulated deficits of the current account (with a 
negative effect on effective demand), the larger the spread between the 
domestic and the foreign interest rate. As mentioned above, an undervalued 
currency means in practice a strong currency with a smaller interest 
premium. Countries with the largest surplus on the structural account of the 
balance of payments (together with a reliable political system) have the 
lowest interest rate spread, which, in case of a substantial surplus, might even 
become negative. 
The reason behind international capital controls in the years following the 
Second World War was to give countries participating in the Bretton Woods 
system the ability to pursue a more independent monetary policy.4 This was, 
of course, of primary interest to those countries that were constrained by 
effective demand but had sufficient foreign exchange reserves. During the 
1960s, it became increasingly difficult to prevent the private sector from 
circumventing international capital regulations. Hence, the beneficial effects 
of capital control were undermined, and participation in a fixed exchange rate 
system required an increasingly larger stock of foreign exchange reserves. 
 
Floating Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Within a floating exchange rate regime, the central bank has no obligation to 
peg the exchange rate. The foreign payments undertaken by the private sector 
have to add up to zero. The exchange rate will adjust in such a way that 
realized demand and supply of foreign exchange equalize. 
A floating exchange rate regime removes the foreign reserve constraint on 
macroeconomic policy. Hence, monetary policy can be directed also toward 
domestic imbalances. 
Without international capital controls, pure financial transactions dominate 
the foreign exchange market and the exchange rate. Unfortunately, however, 
financial markets need an anchor so they do not go astray; but within a 
floating exchange rate regime there is no such anchor. Misguided 
expectations can make the exchange rate be adrift for years, which might then 
harm the foreign competing sectors considerably (see for instance Harvey, 
1999). 
If governments want to pursue a stabilization (full-employment) policy, 
then a domestic-oriented demand management policy may countervail the 
disturbances to effective demand caused by an over- or undervalued 
exchange rate within a floating exchange rate regime. In fact, recent research 
has shown that pre-announced exchange rate targets defined with reference to 
macroeconomic fundamentals, that is, a purchasing power index, may have a 
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stabilizing effect in a world of imperfect knowledge (Frydman and Goldberg, 
2004). In that case, the central bank has to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market, not in order to defend a specific exchange rate, but rather to market a 
signalling effect that might give to market participants a kind of guidance 
with regard to fundamentals. The development of the euro–dollar exchange 
rate is an illustrative example, where limited interventions could have had an 
effect without the European Central Bank risking being foreign-reserves 
constrained. 
Another more structural-oriented aspect related to a floating exchange rate 
regime is price stability. Economies in transition may need an external anchor 
for the domestic process of inflation. Speedy and far-reaching structural 
changes within the real economy might fuel an internal process of inflation, 
which needs some brakes. Depending on the transmission mechanism a 
floating exchange rate will reduce the impact of this external brake. As a 
consequence monetary policy in a floating exchange rate system, following 
the advice of the new-consensus theory, is directed towards a specific 
inflation target. But, in practice, the impact of monetary policy on price 
developments is uncertain. It has to pass through the formation of 
expectations in a world of imperfect knowledge. This is not the place to 
discuss inflation theory in a post-Keynesian perspective. One could only note 
that the balance of powers in the labour market, the welfare systems, and the 
level of unemployment are equally important factors (see Arestis, 1992). 
 
Summing Up 
 
There is no simple theoretical conclusion with regard to making a robust 
design of the exchange rate arrangement with reference to the EU-10 
countries. In this section we identified four different systems, which are 
presented in Table 7.1. The right choice depends on the priorities of the 
overall macroeconomic stability, and even more importantly on the economic 
theory lying behind the evaluation. Furthermore, the best design depends on 
what kind of shocks are the most likely: internal or external; real or nominal. 
Taking into consideration that the EU-10 countries are small economies, 
shocks are mainly expected to be caused by internal factors. (External shocks 
are expected to be rather symmetrically and handled at the EU level.) 
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Table 7.1. Different exchange rate arrangements 
 
 Macroeconomic target 
 Employment 
(demand management) 
Inflation 
(foreign anchor) 
Floating exchange rate ++ – 
Fixed, but adjustable 
exchange ratea +++ + 
Fixed exchange rate 
(ERM2) + ++ 
Monetary unionb – +++ 
Notes: the number of + indicates the ability of the exchange rate arrangement to cope 
with internal real (employment) or nominal (inflation) shocks; a adjustable with regard 
to securing a sustainable surplus in the current account; b with binding requirements 
on national fiscal policy. 
 
One can sum up the arguments concerning macroeconomic stability in the 
following way. Employment is affected by effective demand (and structural 
policies). If effective demand is constrained, real stability is at risk. In 
addition, the internal process of inflation is difficult to manage through 
macroeconomic policies: it is often a consequence of structural imbalances 
and uncoordinated struggles over income shares running out of control. A 
fixed exchange rate regime may give a nominal guideline on price formation, 
but no guarantee that inflation is at bay. 
Hence, in transition economies, a floating exchange rate arrangement may 
remove the ‘foreign-reserve constraint’, but at a price of forsaking the 
inflation anchor. Conversely, a fixed exchange rate arrangement à la ERM2 
gives a kind of nominal anchor, but leaves the country vulnerable to effective 
demand shocks. 
A well-designed (that is, fixed but adjustable) exchange rate regime could 
support full-employment policies, especially if adjustments were coordinated 
at a regional level to prevent beggar-your-neighbour policies. In that case 
capital control is not really an issue, because it does not make sense to 
speculate against a ‘healthy’ currency. Whereas, a badly-designed fixed 
exchange rate regime causes real uncertainty which, furthermore, can be 
reinforced by waves of speculative financial flows (Davidson, 2002b).  
A monetary union removes the foreign reserve constraint definitely, and 
provides a nominal anchor (defined by the average inflation rate) for the 
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participating countries, but leaves especially small and open economies 
vulnerable to effective demand shocks and fiscal crises if they are out of tune 
with the major countries. 
 
 
DO THE EU-10 COUNTRIES FIT THE EUROPEAN 
MONETARY UNION? 
 
This section evaluates the likely impact of the EU-10 countries embarking on 
the route to the EMU. Before we go into a more detailed analysis, from Table 
7.2 it is obvious that there is a dividing line between the six smallest 
countries5 (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia) and the 
somewhat larger countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia) of the EU-10. The smaller countries seem to have a politically-
defined goal of joining the EMU as quickly as possible, leaving the real 
macroeconomic considerations aside, whereas the larger countries have taken 
a more contemplative attitude, before they lock their currency up in the 
formal ERM2 arrangement. 
 
Table 7.2. Exchange rate arrangements of the EU-10 countries as of May 
2005 
 
Joined ERM2 in June 2004 
Estonia (unilaterally decided to maintain a currency board) 
Lithuania (unilaterally decided to maintain a currency board) 
Slovenia 
 
Joined ERM2 in May 2005 
Cyprus 
Latvia (unilaterally reduced fluctuation band to ±1 per cent) 
Malta 
 
Floating exchange rate arrangements 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Sources: European Central Bank (2004), Convergence Report; European Central 
Bank (2005), Monthly Bulletin, Frankfurt: European Central Bank. 
12 Exchange Rate Systems: From Instability to Stability 
 
According to the EU Treaty, new member countries are committed to pursue 
an economic policy that makes them qualified to a membership of the EMU 
without any unduly delays. The convergence criteria of the EMU consist of 
requirements related to low inflation, low rates of interest, a public budget 
deficit not exceeding 3 per cent of GDP, a public debt below 60 per cent of 
GDP, and participation in the ERM2 for at least two years without tensions 
within the band defined as ±15 per cent around the central exchange rate 
against the euro. 
 
Why a European Monetary Union? 
 
The EU had (and still has) the ambition of being an economic (and political) 
heavy weight on the world stage that could match the two – at that time – 
superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. For that purpose, a 
single European currency was considered important. Furthermore, it was 
argued that the economic counterpart of ‘one Europe’ would be ‘one money’, 
which could reduce costs of cross-border transactions (in goods, services, 
tourism) and increase transparency and competition. 
On the other hand, obtaining macroeconomic benefits from the use of a 
single currency is less obvious. In that case, participating countries have to be 
economically well integrated and quite similar with respect to their 
vulnerability to internal and external shocks (as suggested by the theory of 
‘optimal currency areas’, OCAs; see De Grauwe, 2005, for a textbook 
presentation of the costs and benefits of OCAs). 
Plans for such a monetary union were put forward as far back as 1969 – 
the so-called Werner Plan. But it was not before the late 1980s that an 
elaborate and realistic plan leading to a European Monetary Union was 
designed. At that time, the overarching goal was political unification. For that 
purpose, a single currency was seen as a useful instrument. To give the euro a 
status as a strong international currency, it was considered necessary to keep 
inflation low in all participating countries. The design of the EMU was 
directed towards this goal by strengthening the nominal anchor. The main 
instrument was an independent central bank only responsible for price 
stability, and narrowly defined strings on the fiscal policy conducted by the 
member countries. 
The deliberate political intention (and a requirement by the German 
government before giving up the Deutschmark) was to give the monetary 
union a deflationary bias to ensure that the nominal stability of the new 
currency was not put at risk. In practice, it has been showed that the EMU 
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has a strong deflationary bias (see Arestis and Sawyer, 1999). As a 
consequence of the substantial budget consolidations required during the 
1990s, economic growth within the euro area was at its lowest since the 
Second World War, and unemployment at its highest. 
After the spring of 1998, when the formal decision was taken regarding 
which countries would form the monetary union, there was a brief period of 
relief over fiscal policy. As a result, growth resumed, as in the German case. 
This expansion only lasted a few years. Then, the requirements of the SGP 
forced a number of countries, which found themselves in conflict with the 3 
per cent rule (deficit to GDP ratio), to restrict their fiscal policy. Furthermore, 
the ECB was tough on monetary policy, because the rate of inflation was 
continuously above the self-declared target of 2 per cent. When the 
international boom ended in 2001, a number of EMU countries realized that 
they could not keep the budget deficit within the narrow limit of 3 per cent of 
GDP. The automatic stabilizers were much too strong, which initially 
prevented the recession from deepening too much. But the requirements of 
the SGP caused the EU countries to reduce their cyclically-adjusted budget 
deficits. Unless something unforeseeable happens in the international arena, 
the EMU-countries could remain for an extended period in this low growth 
trap, which, in fact, had destabilised the political process within the EU (Bini 
Smaghi, 2004, p. 173).6 
For this very reason, three of the ‘old’ EU members (the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, and Denmark) have chosen to stay outside the EMU – although they 
all fulfil the formal convergence criteria. These countries do not need an 
external nominal anchor, and the restrictions on effective demand are 
considered much too narrow. It is remarkable that on the issue of joining the 
EMU, the popular vote was significantly different from the recommendation 
of the political leadership in Sweden and Denmark (and polls suggest that the 
same will happen in the United Kingdom if a referendum is called on 
substituting the pound with the euro). There are no simple explanations for 
this divide between the people and the politicians, but the divide seems to 
indicate that Danish and Swedish voters weighted macroeconomic stability 
with low rates of unemployment, an extended welfare state, and decentralized 
decision-making higher than to take part in a European currency area with the 
aim of matching the dollar in the global arena (Jespersen, 2004). The 
outcome of the referenda in France and The Netherlands may be interpreted 
in the same direction, that the population is more worried about securing the 
welfare systems than to go on improving economic efficiency at any costs.   
These are the background considerations upon which the EU-10 countries 
have to decide their future exchange rate arrangements. 
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The Road Ahead for the EU-10 Countries7 
 
The EU was enlarged by 10 countries in May 2004.8 These countries have 75 
millions of inhabitants, which equals 20–25 per cent of the population of the 
EU-15. Economically, these Eastern and Central European member countries 
are miniscule. Together, they only account for 5 per cent of the EU-15’s GDP 
(with Poland counting for approximately one third of the EU-10’s GDP, see 
Table 7.3). This means that if measured at the actual exchange rates, the 
average level of income (per capita) is only around 30 per cent of the ‘old’ 
member countries (the EU-15). If measured in purchasing-power-adjusted 
exchange rates, however, the difference in income levels comes closer to 50 
per cent (on average). In fact, the income level varies from 77 per cent of the 
EU-15 level in Cyprus to 40 per cent in the Baltic countries. Although growth 
rates have been quite impressive in recent years in a number of the new 
member countries of the EU, unemployment is still very high. Countries that 
are among the worst hit are Poland and Slovakia, which have close to 20 per 
cent registered unemployed. The Czech Republic and Hungary are doing 
better regarding unemployment, but have on the other hand huge current 
account deficits as well as substantial fiscal deficits9(see Table 7.3). 
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Table 7.3. Key statistics of the new EU member countries 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
 % % % % %/GDP %/GDP 
Fixed exchange rate (ERM2) members 
Cyprus 77.5 2.0 4.4 4.0 –4.4 –6.2 
Estonia 41.2 4.8 10.0 1.4 –13.7 2.4 
Latvia 37.1 7.5 10.5 2.9 –9.1 –1.9 
Lithuania 42.7 8.9 12.7 –1.1 –6.1 –1.8 
Malta 64.7 0.4 8.2 1.3 –3.4 –9.7 
Slovenia 71.3 2.3 6.5 5.7 0.2 –1.9 
Floating exchange rate members 
Czech Republic 63.8 4.1 8.3 –0.1 –4.8 –13.0 
Hungary 55.1 3.6 6.3 4.7 –7.3 –6.0 
Poland 42.7 4.2 18.2 0.7 –1.3 –4.0 
Slovakia 48.3 4.8 17.9 8.5 –5.7 –3.7 
EU-15 100.0 1.2 9.0 2.0 0.1 –2.4 
Notes: 1. national income (PPP) per capita compared to the EU-15 average; 2. real 
GDP growth rate; 3. unemployment rate; 4. inflation rate; 5. balance of payments, 
current account; 6. public sector budget deficit. The figures for the smaller countries 
refer to 2003, for the larger countries and the EU-15 are OECD projections for 2005 
(except national income per capita). 
Sources: Danmarks Nationalbank (2004), Table 1 and Figure 3 (based on ‘European 
Commission spring economic forecast 2004-05’); Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (2004–5). 
 
Although the EU-10 countries have chosen two different sorts of exchange 
rate arrangements, all of them are characterized by a substantial deficit on the 
current account and high unemployment (see Table 7.3). These 
macroeconomic imbalances indicate unambiguously that the exchange rates 
are overvalued – even in those countries with a free floating exchange rate. 
This is due in part to a strong inflow of foreign direct investment, but also to 
the fact that factors other than relative prices matter when currency traders 
form their expectations. 
Poland has had an increasing rate of unemployment and a substantial 
balance-of-payments deficit for more than ten years. Until 2001, the deficit in 
the current account was around 5 per cent of GDP, then the exchange rate 
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was made free floating. This gave rise to a subsequent fall of more than 30 
per cent in the real effective exchange rate (see Table 7.4) and an 
improvement of the current account. 
Slovakia has also adopted a floating exchange rate, but employment is 
suffering from a highly overvalued currency. It needs a macroeconomic 
adjustment, probably an experience similar to Poland with a substantial drop 
in the exchange rate. This seems unavoidable, because the inflow of foreign 
direct investment has forced the local currency to appreciate much above a 
sustainable level. Then it is a matter of robustness in the financial sector to 
prevent this drop to expose a genuine financial crisis. 
In fact, in the Slovakian case it is obvious that a fixed, but adjustable 
exchange rate regime would have been preferred from a stability point of 
view (see Table 7.1). 
 
Table 7.4. Development of the effective, real exchange rate 
 
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Czech Republic 90.4 98.4 100.0 106.9 104.7 114.4 
Hungary 122.9 121.6 100.0 92.0 91.8 84.2 
Poland 87.9 93.7 100.0 102.4 102.2 107.5 
Slovakia 82.6 89.6 100.0 108.9 127.3 134.0 
EU 101.0 97.5 100.0 100.8 91.0 93.8 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Czech Republic 116.9 115.0 117.8 125.1 122.4 117.6 
Hungary 85.0 77.5 84.8 97.0 101.5 105.7 
Poland 101.3 101.1 104.6 94.5 77.6 69.1 
Slovakia 131.1 141.0 135.9 138.6 148.0 158.3 
EU 92.8 84.0 85.2 89.9 101.1 106.0 
Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004), Economic 
Outlook, December, Table 44. 
 
For the EU-10 countries the effective, real exchange rate is of special 
importance, because they are (except for Poland) highly dependent on foreign 
trade. Imports and exports account for a larger share of GDP in these 
countries than they do for the EU-15. Exports are determined by international 
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competitiveness and foreign effective demand. Unfortunately, the effective 
demand from the EU-15 is held back by low growth, caused by a restrictive 
fiscal policy (SGP) and a monetary policy directed towards price stability. 
The new member countries do not benefit from any kind of ‘Marshall Aid’ 
like the Western European countries did 50 years ago. They have to rely upon 
their competitive abilities and on access to the EU market (which has 450 
million consumers). 
The economic performance of the EU-10 countries is highly exposed to 
external imbalances. A successful growth path has to build on exchange rate 
arrangements, where they have gotten rid of external constraints imposed by 
balance-of-payments imbalances. Otherwise, their foreign debt will pile up, 
and make interest and dividend payments abroad become a millstone around 
their necks. 
To be true, when the new EU members signed the EU Treaty, they 
accepted the political goals of the SGP and gave full membership in the EMU 
and the single European currency a high priority. This means that they are 
asked to conform to the convergence criteria. One of these criteria is to join 
the ERM2 and then not to devaluate the currency at any time in the future. To 
make these requirements successful, it is important that any country running 
a persistent deficit in the current account is allowed to make a pre-entry 
adjustment of the exchange rate to a sustainable level in a longer perspective. 
A sustainable exchange rate should take account of: 
 
• the needed structural adjustments, 
• an unavoidable excess inflation as a part of the transition process, 
• the correction of the actual balance-of-payments deficit, 
• any over-valuation due to net inflow of foreign direct investment, 
• slow growth of the EU-15. 
 
Unfortunately, it is rather likely that the ECB will insist on fixing the ERM2 
exchange rate at the existing level without considerations to future 
development. Using the actual exchange rate (which in fact was the case with 
the six smaller countries both in June 2004 and May 2005) means eliciting 
adjustment problems in the future. One could just look at the recent 
experiences within the EMU, where for instance Greece and Portugal are 
struggling with unemployment and balance-of-payments deficits. Hence, a 
strong competitive position within the EU is a necessary condition for these 
newly industrialised countries to keep growth rates high, especially when the 
increasing global competitive pressure is taken into consideration. 
Ironically, there is a real risk that the earlier the EU-10 countries embark 
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on the road to EMU membership, the more likely it will happen at a long-
term unsustainable exchange rate, which might damage the needed structural 
adjustments owing to increasing balance-of-payments constraints. Lack of 
effective demand is a recipe for economic and political crises. It is a matter of 
dispute to what extent the negative outcome of the referendum in France and 
the Netherlands (spring 2005) can be referred to the unsuccessful economic 
development during the EMU period. 
One more complicating factor is that the slow economic growth of the 
EMU countries caused by the SGP has made the balance of payments of the 
new member countries deteriorate even further in 2004–05. 
 
Instability in a Period of Transition 
 
Within any fiat-money economic system, there is a risk of run-away inflation. 
When a government wants to reap a short-term benefit independently of the 
longer-term costs, borrowing from the banking system at a ‘special’ rate of 
interest is a temptation. Avoiding inflation requires a firm hand when the 
economy is in a process of political transition. The clearing of structural 
imbalances might be facilitated through changes in relative prices, with the 
risk of causing the overall price level to move upward more quickly than 
productivity gains. 
In fact, transition economies have some structural similarities with a post-
war economy. Relative prices have not adjusted for a long period of time; a 
number of traditional market institutions are missing – especially in the 
financial sector. There is a risk that inflation will emerge and build into the 
market system through a wage–price–wage spiral, fuelled by loose monetary 
and fiscal policies and not checked by foreign competition. This was the case 
in Latin America for quite a number of years. It could have been the case of 
Eastern and Central Europe. The prospect of becoming a member of the EU, 
however, gave support to the viewpoint that monetary stability should, at 
least temporarily, be given an overarching priority. 
From a post-Keynesian perspective, it makes more sense to aim at balance 
in the labour market (full employment). Private real investments are 
instrumental in that respect, and could be supported by a low rate of interest. 
As we know from macroeconomic theory, a public sector balance cannot be 
analyzed in isolation. A specific target for the public sector budget has to be 
formulated with respect to the entire macroeconomic system. Otherwise, 
there is a risk of an inconsistent strategy, where the fulfilment of one specific 
target is a blockage to other important macroeconomic goals. In this coherent 
macroeconomic perspective, it becomes obvious why a specific target for the 
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public sector budget easily can be one more constraint on effective demand, 
and hence an obstruction to full employment.10 
 
Looking Ahead 
 
The future is politically and economically uncertain. For this reason, it is 
beyond any doubt that the smallest of the ten new EU countries want to be 
full member of any EU institution as quickly as possible, and is willing to 
adopt the single currency. This is mainly a consequence of the past. These 
countries search for political security, which is found in the core of the EU 
institutions. Furthermore, these small economies are so small that they cannot 
rock the EMU boat even if they go on with macroeconomic imbalances. 
But the EU institutions were originally designed to fit a small number of 
rather homogenous countries. At the time of writing, there are 25 member 
countries, and within a foreseeable future another eight countries might 
become members of the EU. Although they are all rather poor and less 
developed economies, they could, within ten years (or even less), conform to 
the Copenhagen criteria making EU membership possible. In that case, the 
diversity within the EU will have increased even further. It would probably 
be more correct to speak, at least for a while, about disintegration rather than 
integration. This development would raise the question of an EU with several 
speeds of integration and in different dimensions. In practice, this debate 
about how fast and how far the euro area can be enlarged has already started. 
In the previous section, we argued that macroeconomic stability of the 
transition economies requires that effective demand should grow in tandem 
with potential output. This can be supported by an active national policy 
making based on the following principles: 
 
• Direct fiscal policy towards full employment, namely, matching the 
structural budget to the private sector’s savings/real investment imbalance. 
• Prevent the rate of interest (and share prices) to drift too far away from the 
fundamentals (high employment and low inflation); when needed, 
reintroduce international capital controls until macroeconomic balance is 
established through an active monetary policy. 
• Ensure a current account balance (or surplus) by a fixed, adjustable, and 
slightly undervalued exchange rate à la Bretton Woods. 
 
Now, as long as new-consensus macroeconomics is the ‘mainstream’ 
economics within the EU, macroeconomic stability is identified, as we 
mentioned above, with a balanced (so-called sound) budget, strict monetary 
20 Exchange Rate Systems: From Instability to Stability 
policy, and fixed exchange rates without any consideration to employment 
and balance-of-payments problems. 
If the transition economies decide quite quickly to become members of the 
EMU, they run the risk of being caught in this ‘mainstream economics’ trap. 
They might initially gain from a lower real rate of interest and an unlimited 
access to foreign capital. This is a real temptation in the short run; but it 
represents a risk in the longer run, if the rate of inflation in these countries 
continues to stay above the EMU average. Some European countries have in 
varying degrees experienced such a development, where the difference in 
cost levels has accumulated to such an extent that the foreign competing 
sectors are hit hardly. There is no easy solution to this problem within the 
EMU. Without an extended EU budget and a much higher cross-border 
labour mobility, it is difficult to imagine that national differences can be 
equalized within the foreseeable future. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Within the EU the arguments of new-consensus macroeconomics have 
hitherto dominated. In this respect, it is often argued that a monetary union 
with low inflation and balanced public budgets is a precondition for ‘growth 
and stability’. Within the general equilibrium model it is easily shown that 
monetary control and a balanced budget are the best and most reliable 
instruments to secure growth, stability, and high employment. 
The history of the EMU is somewhat different. Ever since it was designed 
in 1992 and implemented in 1999, economic growth has been 
unprecedentedly low and unemployment equally high in a number of 
countries. This development has, of course, questioned the relevance of the 
theoretical arguments behind the EMU. It is hardly an exaggeration to say 
that the predictions made by the new-consensus economists about the 
macroeconomic gains from the EMU have not yet materialized. A number of 
question marks with respect to the design of many European macroeconomic 
institutions have been set more and more frequently. 
As an alternative, post-Keynesian macroeconomics emphasizes the 
constraints on effective demand as a major cause of this disappointing 
development. The design of the EMU process has a number of built-in 
deflationary biases. Furthermore, the new-consensus macroeconomics 
confuses macroeconomic targets with policy instruments. The public sector 
budget, the exchange rate, and the rate of interest are the instruments. 
Growth, inflation, and income distribution are the targets. To make an 
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instrument a target is counterproductive for economic policy making. As we 
have shown, the specific limit of the public sector budget became quickly an 
obstacle to macroeconomic stability. A fixed exchange rate can be useful as 
an instrument to break expectations of continued high inflation; but to make a 
monetary union a target of its own is an example of confusing aims with 
means to prosperity. 
Further, to subdue the discretionary power of national fiscal policy by 
forcing all member states into a one-sized straightjacket of convergence 
criteria and fiscal control is one more example of misunderstood 
homogeneity. EU countries are rather different in structures and in political 
preferences. A common budget rule means in reality very different 
constraints on effective demand, which in the end might increase diversities 
within the EU and cause disintegration. This process will be enforced if the 
EU-10 countries prematurely join the EMU. 
With regard to the EU-10 countries, a better macroeconomic policy would 
be to release them from the severe ERM2 requirement of a fixed exchange 
rate, recalling the history of the European Monetary System in the early 
1990s. By contrast, an expansionary economic policy undertaken by the rich 
EMU countries, combined with substantial aid to the new members – like the 
‘Marshall Aid’ – could much better facilitate the still needed structural 
adjustments. Such a ‘helping-your-neighbour’ policy would – as it did in the 
early 1950s – make effective demand higher and at the same time reduce the 
balance-of-payments constraint. Without doubt this extra foreign aid would 
increase economic growth in the EU-10 countries, which by itself could 
reduce public budget deficits, and makes the recipient countries spend more 
on imports, when the balance-of-payments constraint is relaxed. 
In addition, it might be easier for the new EU member countries to reduce 
inflation rates, if they could participate at a later stage in the ERM2 at a 
sustainable, but still adjustable, exchange rate. For instance, the exchange 
rate arrangement could be quite similar to the Bretton Woods agreement, but 
with an expanded band of fluctuation, for instance ±15 per cent, where all 
countries (surplus as well as deficit countries) have the right and duty of 
adjusting the central rate whenever it is found necessary by some objective 
criteria. 
Last, but not least, according to post-Keynesian macroeconomic theory the 
EU Treaty should be redrafted with regard to the role of the ECB. The 
macroeconomic reality does not conform to the abstract equilibrium model of 
new-consensus macroeconomics, which supports the construction behind the 
ECB. Post-Keynesian economists have shown empirically that there is no 
direct link between money supply (which is endogenously determined and 
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cannot be controlled) and inflation. In fact, monetary policy can affect 
effective demand, real investments, and further on growth and employment. 
To ask the governor of the central bank to secure price stability is a 
contradiction in terms, because he/she has no instrument to control inflation. 
In the real world, monetary policy (like fiscal and exchange rate policies) 
should be pursued as an integral part of a national economic policy of the 
individual EU country, which is undertaken in mutual respect of the other 
member countries and of the EU as a whole. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1. Davidson (2002a) gives a standard presentation of the post-Keynesian views on international 
economics. 
2. The new consensus school considers its analytical framework of general equilibrium models 
based on microeconomic foundations and rational expectations as ideology-free. This is 
what it calls ‘economics proper’. Therefore analytical deviations from this ‘objective’ model 
are caused by ideology or ignorance. This claim of ideology-free theory with regard to the 
construct of the EMU is challenged by a number of contributions in Moss (2004). 
3. Employment in Germany increased from 37.2 million persons in 1997 to 38.9 million 
persons in 2001. See www.laborsta.ilo.org. 
4. Davidson (2002b) elaborates on a proposal for a re-establishment of the Bretton Woods 
system in a modern design. 
5. These countries have a population between 500,000 and 3 millions inhabitants. 
6. In March 2005, the EU Finance Ministers decided to pursue a less strict interpretation of the 
SGP in the future. In practice, this implies that fiscal policy in the future will not have to be 
tightened as much as originally required by the European Commission; but the upper limit 
of 3 per cent is still unchanged. 
7. De Grauwe and Schnabl (2003) put forward a balanced view on political and economic 
considerations. 
8. According to the EU enlargement plan, Rumania and Bulgaria will become members in 
January 2007. 
9
 .  From a superficially point of view there are some similarities with the US economy; but the 
real difference is that the US is the largest economy and the strongest political power which 
in any event seem very attractive for foreign investors.   
10. This misunderstanding is now so well established that for instance the weekly magazine The 
Economist uses the phrase ‘instability and stagnation pact’ as a characteristic of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. 
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